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Abstract
is paper develops an interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics and metaethics
that reconciles his apparent antirealismwith his engagement in normative dis-
course. Interpreting Nietzsche as ametaethical constructivist— as holding, to
a ĕrst approximation, that evaluative facts are grounded purely in facts about
the evaluative attitudes of the creatures to whom they apply— reconciles his
vehement declarations that nothing is valuable in itself with his passionate ex-
pressions of a particular evaluative perspective and injunctions for the free
spirits to create new values. Drawing on Nietzsche’s broader epistemological
and psychological views, I develop a distinctive, and genuinely Nietzschean,
version of constructivism. On this account, evaluative properties are grounded
in aﬀective valuations of the new philosophers. e proposed interpretation
synthesizes a variety of disparate features of Nietzsche’s writings and improves
on existing interpretations in the literature. e resulting version of construc-
tivism is also worthy of attention in contemporary theorizing. e fruits of
understanding the distinctive form of Nietzsche’s ethical theory is an illumi-
nating example of howmetanormative inquiry can undergird normative eval-
uation in practice.
*anks to Brian Leiter, Peter Railton, John Richardson, and two anonymous referees from In-
quiry for helpful discussion and comments on earlier dras.
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ere is something puzzling when the same person who writes:
We have thought the matter over and ĕnally decided that there is nothing
good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but that there
are states of soul in which we impose such words upon things external to and
within us. (D )
also— in the same book even!—writes:
It goes without saying that I do not deny—unless I am a fool— that many
actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called
moral ought to be done and encouraged. (D )
One might not expect the same philosopher to say that “nature is always value-less”
(GS ) and also declaim that those who posit an ideal world “rob reality of its
meaning, value, and truthfulness” (EH P:; emphasis mine)—or, more colorfully,
that the Christian church is “the highest of all conceivable corruptions” and “has
turned every value into an un-value, every truth into a lie, every integrity into a
vileness of the soul” (A ).
Yes, the title gave it away: I am talking about Nietzsche, one of history’s most
vehement critics—of, well, just about everything—and antirealist par excellence.
e puzzle: On the one hand, Nietzsche makes claims to the eﬀect that there are
no evaluative facts (consider: “error theorist,” “nihilist”); but on the other hand, he
ardently engages in evaluative discourse and recommends an evaluative perspective.
e task: Improve our understanding of Nietzsche’s views on the nature of value and
I use the following standard acronyms when citing Nietzsche’s texts: e Antichrist (A); Be-
yond Good and Evil (BGE);e Birth of Tragedy (BT);e Case of Wagner (CW); Daybreak (D); Ecce
Homo (EH);On the Genealogy of Morality (GM);eGay Science (GS);Human, All Too Human (HH);
Nietzsche contra Wagner (NCW); Twilight of the Idols (TI); Untimely Meditations (UM); us Spoke
Zarathustra (Z). I citeeWanderer and His Shadow, incorporated as Part II of Volume II of HH, as
WS. I use Roman numerals to refer to major parts and chapters (if there are any), and Arabic nu-
merals to refer to sections. Regarding Nietzsche’s Nachlass, if a note is included ineWill to Power
(as decided by later editors), I cite it as WP. If it is not included, I cite it by the volume, notebook
number, and note number in C & M  (KSA). I include the year for all notes. I
use material from the notebooks principally as supporting and clarifying ideas found in Nietzsche’s
published works. (See M  for the standard case against relying on the notebooks.)

the practice of valuing to help make sense of these prima facie incongruous aspects
of his normative and metanormative stance.
I am not the ĕrst person to notice this interpretive puzzle, or at least one like
it, in Nietzsche. But I am not satisĕed with existing treatments. In this paper I
will develop an interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics and metaethics that (hopefully!)
oﬀers an improved solution. I will argue that interpreting Nietzsche as a metaeth-
ical constructivist— as holding, to a ĕrst approximation, that evaluative facts are
grounded purely in facts about the evaluative attitudes of the creatures towhom they
apply— can render intelligible his equally fervent injunctions that nothing is valu-
able “in itself,” on the one hand, and endorsements of particular values, on the other.
is interpretation synthesizes a variety of disparate features of Nietzsche’s writings,
including his perspectivism, his occasional preference for ardent rhetoric over regi-
mented argumentation, his project of the “revaluation of all values,” and the connec-
tion between the threat of practical nihilism and the creation of values. e result-
ing normative andmetanormative viewpoint is not only coherent— it would not be
uncharitable to attribute it to a person of Nietzsche’s acuity and pedigree—but also
worthy of consideration in contemporary theorizing. It is a view that certainlymight
be defended, at least in its central features even if not in all its details. e fruits of
understanding the distinctive form of Nietzsche’s ethics is a compelling example of
how metanormative inquiry can undergird normative evaluation in practice.
Before beginning our investigation, a word of interpretive caution is in order. To
a certain extent one can barely take oneself seriouslywhen talking about “metaethics”
in the history of philosophy, especially when ascribing a particularmetaethical view,
as if it were in some sense “his,” to someone as notoriously critical of interpretations
of oneself and others as Nietzsche. Interpreting Nietzsche is diﬃcult enough as it is
given, among other things, his penchant for rhetorical excesses, the aphoristic and
literary style of some of his works, his deliberate eﬀorts to conceal his meaning from
readers he deems unworthy or unprepared, and his own warnings about how par-
ticular claims of his must be understood in the context of his entire body of work
A distinction is sometimes made between deontic terms (‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘reason’) and evaluative
terms (‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘beautiful’). It is not uncontroversial how these families of terms are related, either
in general or for Nietzsche. I will use ‘normative’ broadly to cover terms in both families; and though
I oen couch the discussion in terms of speciĕcally evaluative notions and claims, the points apply
to deontic notions and claims as well. No harm will come from this since Nietzsche’s apparently
nihilistic metanormative claims are about both types of terms, and his positive substantive claims
use both types of terms.
SeeW : –; R : , : , –, –; L : ,
: –, –; C & D : –; H : –, : –,
a: ; W : ; K : ; J & R a: –.

(e.g., GM P:). Add to this the fact that metaethics did not even begin to come into
its own until the mid-th century, with there still being a lack of consensus even on
how to formulate certain classic questions and positions, and one may feel tempted
to despair of the possibility of our interpretive enterprise before we even begin.
Some interpreters have indeed come to such a conclusion. But I am more op-
timistic. Of course Nietzsche did not present his views in quite the terms or with
quite the systematicity that characterizes the presentation in this paper. But I hope
to show that by ascribing the proposed views to Nietzsche we can make better sense
of the character and content of his writings than we otherwise would. Some breadth
of discussion will be required. Attending to the relevant range of issues will help
us appreciate the complexity and synthesis of Nietzsche’s views. At minimum, per-
haps we can delineate an interesting normative andmetanormative perspective, one
worthy of attention in its own right.
Roadmap: Aer laying out our interpretive puzzle in greater detail (§), I will
show how interpreting Nietzsche as a metaethical constructivist can help solve it
(§). Drawing on Nietzsche’s broader epistemological and psychological views, I
will then develop this Nietzschean version of constructivism in greater detail (§).
Particular attention will be paid to the nature and source of the attitudes that are
treated as grounding the existence of values. e resulting (non-Kantian) version of
constructivism represents a distinctive position in contemporary metaethics which
improves upon shortcomings of similar accounts. Finally, to help clarify the connec-
tion, for Nietzsche, between values, evaluative attitudes, and evaluative judgments,
I will address several alternative subjectivist realist, non-cognitivist, and ĕctionalist
interpretations (§). As we will see, interpretations like the one I am proposing have
not received due consideration in the literature. A more nuanced understanding of
the space of metaethical possibilities can help throw into relief a more plausible nor-
mative and metanormative view we can attribute to Nietzsche.
 e puzzle
Some of Nietzsche’s claims about value can appear puzzling when seen alongside his
expressions of his own values. Let’s make this appearance more concrete.
First, a persistent theme throughout Nietzsche’s writings is that nothing has
value in itself and that, consequently, all evaluative judgments necessarily involve
a kind of error. ough Nietzsche oen focuses his attacks on speciĕcally moral
E.g., W : ; R : ; H : , –.

properties and claims, his critiques, even throughout his mature period, seem to
extend to all normative and evaluative properties and claims. In addition to D 
and GS  (see §), consider:
What means do we have for making things beautiful, attractive, and desirable
when they are not? And in themselves I think they never are! (GS )
[T]o demand that our human interpretations and values should be universal
and perhaps constitutive values [somehow inhering in the nature of the world
independent of human beings] is one of the hereditary madnesses of human
pride. (WP  [])
ese passages might be taken to suggest an error theory: prima facie, we have a
metaphysical claim about how the world is, and an associated semantic claim about
the truth values of evaluative sentences. But let’s refrain from applying contempo-
rary labels for the moment and just focus on the claims themselves. Any interpreta-
tion must account for Nietzsche’s persistent claims that nothing has value “in itself.”
Second, as a counterpoint to these apparently “nihilistic” claims, Nietzsche ex-
presses his own evaluative views and even calls for the “creation” of new values.
One of Nietzsche’s primary concerns is what he calls the revaluation of values. e
negative part of this project, the critique of morality, is well known (if not always
well understood). But Nietzsche’s positive injunction for the “philosophers of the
future” to ĕll the evaluative void and create new values—new life-aﬃrming values
that express the “ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life” (EH
BT:)— is just as important, perhaps more important, to his overall vision.
ough Nietzsche dissects our values and evaluative practices as theorist, he
also engages in normative discourse. On the Genealogy of Morality is subtitled “A
Polemic.” Central toNietzsche’s critique ofmorality is a distinction between “higher”
and “lower” types of people. Nietzsche critiquesmorality, “but why? Out of morality!
Or what else should we call that which informs it— and us?…But there is no doubt
that a ‘thou shalt’ still speaks to us too, that we too still obey a stern law set over us
(D P:). ough “[f]ree of morality,” “when the consciousmind has attained its high-
est degree of freedom it is involuntarily led to” “the individual virtues, moderation,
justice, repose of soul” (WS ). To use one of his favorite contrasts, though Niet-
zsche is “Beyond Good and Evil.—At least this does not mean ‘Beyond Good and
Bad’ ” (GM I:). Not all evaluative judgments are treated on a par, for Nietzsche.
See, e.g., HH ; D ; BGE ; CW E; TI VII:; WP  [].
See also HH P:, –; D ; GS ; Z I:,, II:; BGE P; TI II:; A ; WP  [], 
[],  [–].

He not only takes up a particular normative perspective himself, but also regards it
as, in some sense, warranted or ĕtting, and disagrees with individuals who accept
a contrary alternative: Christian morality “reverse[s]” “the concepts of ‘true’ and
‘false’…: whatever is most harmful to life is called ‘true’; whatever elevates it, en-
hances, aﬃrms, justiĕes it, makes it triumphant, is called ‘false’ ” (A ). Apparently,
Nietzsche regards some values as having genuine normative force.
Butwhence this normative force? OneofNietzsche’s favoredmetaphors—meta-
phors?— is to treat these genuine values as created. It is the task of the “new philoso-
phers,” the “philosophers of the future” (BGE , , )— as heralded by the
“higher types” (BGE; A; EH III:, IV:) and “free spirits” (GS ; BGE ch. )— to
be “creators… who write new values on new tablets” (Z P:). “[W]hat is good
and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He, however, creates man’s
goal and gives the earth its meaning and its future. at anything at all is good and
evil— that is his creation” (Z III:.). Similarly: “He who determines values and
directs the will of millennia by giving direction to the highest natures is the highest
man” (WP  []); he is “value-creating” (BGE ). What is special about the
new philosophers is not simply that new things come to serve as the objects of their
evaluative attitudes. If people began valuing things that harmed the higher types in
new ways and prevented the achievement of human Ęourishing and excellence, Ni-
etzsche would not be quite so enthusiastic. Rather, Nietzsche is suggesting that the
new philosophers can, and must, create new genuine values: values that make legiti-
mate claims on us and aﬀord a critical, authoritative perspective on how to act, feel,
and be. It is this that distinguishes the revaluation of values of the new philosophers
from the revaluation of values of the slaves in the slave revolt (GM I).
See also, among many others, D , , ; GS , ; BGE , , , , , , ,
, , , ; GM P:,,, I:, II:; A , , , , ; TI V:,, IX:; EH IV:,,; WP 
[],  [, ],  [–],  []. ough Nietzsche sometimes treats certain
evaluative questions as matters of “taste” (GS , ; Z III:.; WP  [–]), he treats
taste itself as rational and capable of genuine insight into reality, oen even as more reliable than
reĘection (PTG ; GS , , , , , ; Z II:; BGE , , ; CW , ; EH II:). For
our purposes we can bracket the contentious question of what, if anything, Nietzsche took to be the
primary locus of non-instrumental value— e.g., power, freedom, creativity, valuing, Ęourishing, ex-
cellence. See, e.g., L , R  for discussion of the “scope problem,” the problem
of delimiting Nietzsche’s critical target so as to make room for his endorsements of a positive ideal.
It is not always transparent howNietzsche understands the relation between these categories of
individuals. For consistency, I will say that it is the free spirits that Nietzsche enjoins to create new
values, and that it is the new philosophers, a subclass of free spirits and higher types, that actually
create such new values.
See alsoGWVI:  []; GS , , , , ; Z I:, I:, I:, II:, II:, III:, III..;
BGE , ; A , ; EH IV:; WP  [–],  [],  [].

ough Nietzsche’s claims about value creation are in prima facie tension with
his apparently systematic attributions of falsity to evaluative judgments—hence the
puzzle— it is important to see that Nietzsche himself regards them as related. e
broader contexts of certain of the apparently error-theoretic passages above are il-
luminating in this regard. Reconsider GS  (see also Z I:):
It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continuallymake something
that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, col-
ors, weights, perspectives, scales, aﬃrmations, and negations…Whatever has
value in the present world has it not in itself, according to its nature—nature
is always value-less—but has rather been given, granted value, and we were
the givers and granters! Only we have created the world that concerns human
beings!
In a manner to be explained, certain things, for Nietzsche, do have value— though
not “in themselves”— and it is somehow human beings who are responsible for this.
is point will be crucial in our interpretation.
Although it is human beings who have somehow conferred value on things, not
just any human beings and not just any values will do. Nietzsche took there to be
epistemic constraints on value creation. It is a measure of strength or greatness how
much “terrible insight into reality” (EHZ:) one can bear and aﬃrm: “Error… is not
blindness, error is cowardice” (EH P:). Nietzsche’s higher type “conceives reality as
it is, being strong enough to do so” (EH IV:). In a section titled “Intellectual con-
science,” Nietzsche warns against having and living according to beliefs “without ĕrst
becoming aware of the ĕnal andmost certain reasons pro and con, andwithout even
troubling [oneself] about such reasons aerwards”; it is “the desire for certainty…
which separates the higher human beings from the lower!” (GS ).
How can one satisfy this “intellectual conscience” in the creation of values? e
new philosopher’s values must be informed by, or at least consistent with, sensory
evidence and the sciences— in particular, the truths gleaned by genealogy concern-
See also BT SC ;WS ; D , ; GS P:, , , , , –, , ; Z II:., IV:;
BGE , , –; GM I:,, II:, III:; TI X:; A , ; EH BT:, IV:, IV:; WP  [],
 []. See W ; R , ; H  for further discussion.
ough Nietzsche grants that having false beliefs can sometimes be necessary for preserving and
promoting one’s life and the species (e.g., UM II:I; GS , ; BGE , , –), his misgivings
about the value of truth and knowledge are misgivings about their unconditional and unquestioned
value. For instance, aer claiming that what is needed for the preservation of the human race is
“virtuous stupidity,” he notes that “there is certainly something to be said for the exception”— i.e., “the
explorers of truth above all”— “provided it never wants to become the rule” (GS ; cf. GM III:–).

ing the psychological, physiological, and biological origins and history of these val-
ues. e created values must also reĘect the discipline of the scientiĕc method.
For example, they must be treated as partial and revisable; they must have “style”
and unity; and, crucially, they must embody insights from many perspectives. In-
deed, occupying diﬀerent, possibly opposed points of view is a “precondition” for
the new philosopher’s ultimate “task”: to “create values” (BGE ). Our inter-
pretation must capture how these epistemic considerations constrain the process of
value creation.
To recap, our interpretive puzzle is this. At the metanormative level, Nietzsche
claims that nothing is valuable in itself and that normative judgment systematically
involves a kind of error. But at the substantive normative level, Nietzsche engages in
normative discourse and expresses his acceptance of a particular system of norms.
Further, he enjoins the free spirits to create new values, somethingwhichwould only
make sense if he thought that the free spirits could ground the existence of genuine
values, values which could make certain normative claims true. In short: ough
(a) Nietzsche claims that nothing has value in itself, (b) he engages in normative
discourse, endorsing certain values and rejecting others, and (c) calls for the new
philosophers to create new values, (d) values that must meet certain conditions for
them to have genuine normative force.
 Nietzschean constructivism: e basics
By interpretingNietzsche as ametaethical constructivist we can capture these seem-
ingly conĘicting elements of his normative and metanormative position.
. Metaethical constructivism: What?
First, it will be helpful to say a bit about how I am understanding constructivism.
e term ‘constructivism’ has been applied to a variety of alternative views, not all
of which may count as constructivist in my sense. But let’s not get hung up on ter-
minology; no use fetishizing ‘constructivism’. I will try to keep the introduction of
terminology to a minimum and focus on the substance of the various claims.
On genealogy: GS ; GM P:–, I Note; EH BT:, IV:. On science and the senses: HH ,
, , , ; D ; Z II:; BGE ; TI III:–; A ; WP  [],  [–], 
[]. On partiality and revisability: D ; GS , ; BGE ; A  (cf. K : –
on Nietzsche’s “experimentalism”). On occupying diverse perspectives: HH P:; GS ; BGE ;
GM III:; EH I:— and then integrating them with style: D ; GS , , ; BGE , ,
; TI IX:; WP  [],  [–],  []. See also nn. , , .

Constructivism, as I am using the term, is a metaethical position about the na-
ture of normative properties in general. It is a metaphysical position about what
it is to be good or bad, right or wrong, or a normative reason to do something.
us constructivism does not merely make an extensionality claim about what has
value, as expressible by a biconditional of the form “X is valuable iﬀ…”. Nor does it
simply make an epistemological claim about what probiliĕes normative truths, or a
supervenience claim about what ĕxes normative truths. Rather, constructivism an-
swers the following sorts of questions: Fundamentally, what, if anything, ultimately
grounds (constitutes, determines) that something is non-instrumentally valuable?
Or that something is a reason for someone to do something? Constructivism oﬀers
an answer to the question of what grounds normative facts, or of what fundamen-
tally makes it the case that something is valuable, etc.
e notions of fundamentality and ground at play here are metaphysical ones;
they are the same as those used in claims that Socrates is more fundamental than his
singleton {Socrates}, that physical properties ground mental properties, etc. ese
notions are familiar, not only in recent discussions of metaphysical determination
and dependence, but also, to some extent, in ordinary speech. Roughly, to say that
one class of facts is grounded in another class of facts is to say that the former ob-
tain in virtue of the latter, or that the latter depend on the former. To say that the
solubility of a sugar cube is grounded in the arrangement of its molecules is to say
that it is in virtue of, or because of, the arrangement of its molecules that the sugar
cube counts as being soluble; that the sugar cube is soluble is neither a brute fact nor
something “over and above” the facts about the sugar cube’s molecular constitution.
Further, we commonly take some facts and properties be more fundamental than
others. For instance, a central aim of normative ethical theory is to locate the most
fundamental moral principles, if any there be. Telling Alice you will help her and
then failing to do so may be wrong because it is a break of a promise, and acts of
promise breaking may be wrong because they are prohibited by the set of optimiĕc
rules.
Despite the increased currency of these notions, I want to Ęag that it is not un-
contentious precisely how they ought to be understood, or what role they ought to
play in philosophical theorizing. ough, for concreteness, I will couch the dis-
cussion in terms of the notion of ground, this is inessential. What is important for
I will focus primarily on practical normative properties. I brieĘy address epistemic normative
properties in §..
See, e.g., S , R , F , T  for discussion. anks to an
anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify the operative notion of ground here and its relation to
the characterization of naturalism below.

present purposes is that constructivism, as I am understanding it, constitutes a po-
sition in the familiar metaethical debates about the nature of normative properties,
their reducibility to natural properties, and the like. Readers who prefer to under-
stand these issues in other terms may feel free to recast the discussion accordingly
(e.g., in terms of reduction, constitution, identity).
Constructivism, as I am understanding it, is a species of metaethical naturalism,
the view that being valuable (e.g.) is grounded in beingN, for some natural property
N. Metaethical naturalists divide not only on the question of what natural property
grounds the normative property in question, but also on the relation between this
natural property, whatever it is, and agents’ evaluative attitudes. at is, they divide
on the question of whether facts about the actual or counterfactual evaluative atti-
tudes of agents play an essential role in grounding the normative facts. Let’s call this
question the question of whether normative properties are attitude-dependent.
-
Normative properties are ultimately grounded in properties of agents’ eval-
uative attitudes (perhaps in conjunction with the non-normative facts about
the relevant circumstances).
(Henceforth I will typically leave the qualiĕer concerning the relevant circumstances
implicit. For the moment, by ‘evaluative attitude’ I mean any attitude that tends to
motivate an agent when combined with her ordinary factual beliefs; thus not all
evaluative attitudes in this sense need concern values. More on evaluative attitudes
in §..)
Metaethical constructivists accept that normative properties are attitude-dependent
in this sense (more brieĘy, they “accept attitude-dependence”). Normative facts,
on this view, are nothing “over and above” facts about agents’ evaluative attitudes.
Whatmakes a normative judgment correct is that it coheres with the relevant agent’s
(/agents’) evaluative attitudes, where constructivist theoriesmaydiﬀer onwhat agent
is (/class of agents are) “relevant” and what the relevant sense of “coherence” is.
Treating values as constructed out of agents’ evaluative attitudes leaves room for
how agents can be normatively mistaken, though only in certain ways. What an
us I use ‘constructivism’ in a broader sense than Street (e.g., : ). For developments
of metaethical constructivism, see especially S , also her b, . See also K-
 , B , V , and L , as well as the collection of papers
in L & S . For critical discussions of various forms of constructivism, see, e.g.,
D  . : –; W ; S-L : ch. ; H & S
; E .

agent values and what is genuinely valuable for her can come apart, but only if she is
mistaken about properties of the relevant evaluative attitudes, or perhaps about the
non-normative facts.
Note that this characterization of constructivism leaves open whether any nor-
mative facts are universal, or apply to all agents. So-called Kantian versions of con-
structivism accept that some reasons or values are universal (K ),
whereas Humean versions deny this (S ). (More on this in §..) ough
some positions in the Kantian tradition may presuppose notions of reasonableness
or agency that are incompatible with Nietzsche’s broader views, I will bracket those
features in what follows.
. e core puzzle: A constructivist solution
Treating Nietzsche as a metaethical constructivist in this sense can help us respond
to our interpretive puzzle.
First, we can make sense of Nietzsche’s claims that nothing is valuable in itself,
i.e., independent of agents’ attitudes. Constructivism denies that normative prop-
erties are irreducible to natural properties and that they inhere in the nature of the
world independently of human evaluative attitudes. e constructivist wholeheart-
edly agrees that values do not “constitute the essence and heart of things” (HH ),
that they are not “eternal and unconditioned” (GS ), and so on. Treating Niet-
zsche as a metaethical constructivist is thus consistent with his general naturalistic
stance.
Second, despite denying that there are attitude-independent or irreducible nor-
mative properties, the constructivist aﬃrms that there are normative properties all
the same. Attitude-dependent properties are not second-rate as properties. If we
interpret Nietzsche as accepting attitude-dependence, there is thus nothing curi-
ous about his emphatic engagement in normative discourse, his endorsements and
rejections of various values, or his reliance on a distinction between “higher” and
“lower” value systems and types of human beings. Even if there cannot be attitude-
independent reasons for adopting one value over another, there can be genuine rea-
sons all the same.
ird, the constructivist can give a precise interpretation of Nietzsche’s claims
that the new philosophers “create” values. e new philosophers create values not in
the sense that they can invent or elicit new evaluative attitudes at will. is would be
psychologically implausible and philosophically suspect: values exert genuine nor-
mative force; they govern the will (§§–). Rather, Nietzsche’s talk of value creation
can be understood metaphysically in terms of the thesis of attitude-dependence:

values are created by the new philosophers in the sense of being grounded in their
evaluative attitudes. As we saw in §, Nietzsche himself sometimes juxtaposes his
denials of the independence of values with his aﬃrmations that values depend for
their existence and content on human evaluative attitudes. For example, in GS :
“Whatever has value in the present world has it not in itself, according to its na-
ture—nature is always value-less”— i.e., there are no attitude-independent evalua-
tive properties— “but has rather been given, granted value, and we were the givers
and granters!”— i.e., there are values and they depend essentially for their existence
on human evaluative attitudes. ere is thus a real sense in which the new philoso-
phers can create new values, values with genuine normative force.
We can further clarify this point by distinguishing two notions of value. On the
one hand, ‘value’ can refer to a certain psychological state or attitude that is open
to empirical study, or to the content of such a state or attitude. I will call values in
this sense values in the descriptive sense. On the other hand, ‘value’ can refer to those
values in the descriptive sense that make legitimate claims on us, or those which we
ought to, or have reason to, have or promote (for some appropriate speciĕcation of
‘us’ and ‘we’). I will call values in this sense values in the normative sense, or gen-
uine values. (My use of ‘value’ in either sense thus retains the ambiguity in whether
it is the state of mind or its content that is being referred to. Making a distinction
between values in the descriptive sense and values in the normative sense does not
prejudge any questions concerning the relation between their extensions, or con-
cerning the relation between normative and natural properties and concepts. It is
thus consistent with this terminology to say that all and only values in descriptive
sense are values in the normative sense, and to deny that evaluative properties are
irreducibly normative or fundamental.) We can then put Nietzsche’s claim as fol-
lows: By coming to value new things in the descriptive sense, the new philosophers
can thereby create new values in the normative sense.
anks to anonymous referees for pressing me to clarify the relevant sense of “creation” and
the operative notions of value. ere is an interpretive question of whether Nietzsche regards the
normative distinction among values in the descriptive sense (i.e., the contents of individuals’ eval-
uative attitudes) as a binary one—one which distinguishes those that are “genuine” and those that
are “non-genuine”—or rather as a gradable one—one which invokes a “rank order” among values
that reĘects their relative expression of, say, power, freedom, health, etc. Given our purposes I re-
main neutral on this question. ough I will oen frame the discussion in terms of what makes it
the case that certain values are “genuinely normative” for Nietzsche, sympathizers with the “rank or-
der” interpretation may understand this as being about what grounds the value of the property that
determines the rank ordering on values, and thus about what makes it the case that certain values
are highest, or suﬃciently high, in the rank order. What is important here is that constructivism
constitutes an answer to either of these metaethical questions about the metaphysics, or grounds, of

Interpreting Nietzsche as a constructivist also gives new meaning to his occa-
sional penchant for strong rhetoric (see S a for further discussion). Given
constructivism’s claim that values are grounded in human evaluative attitudes, by
changing the attitudes of his readers, Nietzsche may also change what normative
facts hold of them, e.g., what is valuable for them, what their normative reasons for
action are, and so on. As the free spirits come to endorse certain of Nietzsche’s own
values, such things may come to be genuinely valuable for them. Insofar as people
can come to value certain things non-consciously (§.), Nietzsche can eﬀect this
change in their values, in both the descriptive and normative senses, without their
even needing to realize it—hence his description of his books as “ĕsh hooks” (EH
BGE:), perhaps. ere is a benign sense in which this use of rhetoric is par for the
course in philosophical ethics; it is commonplace to use “examples and a bit of ten-
dentious rhetoric” (R : ) to draw one’s audience into one’s evaluative
perspective and “pump their intuitions.” But given Nietzsche’s metaethics, he can
be treated as doing something much more radical—namely, changing the attitudes
of the free spirits and, by virtue of doing so, also changing what normative facts hold
of them.
In these ways, by interpreting Nietzsche as a metaethical constructivist we can
resolve the core aspects of our initial interpretive puzzle. We can reconcile his claims
that nothing is valuable in itself with his engagement in normative discourse and his
calls for the free spirits to create new genuine values. But there is still much more
work to be done. At themoment, the constructivist position ascribed toNietzsche is
more of a schema than a full-Ęedged view. In the next section I will consider several
ways of ĕlling in the details of the proposal to form a genuinely Nietzschean version
of constructivism, one that not only speaks to our initial puzzle but also integrates
with Nietzsche’s broader philosophical views.
 Nietzschean constructivism: e details
According to constructivism, normative facts are grounded in facts about the eval-
uative attitudes of a certain class of agents. To ĕll in this constructivist schema we
must specify two things: ĕrst, what the relevant class of agents is whose attitudes
ground—or, wemight say, comprise the construction base of— the normative prop-
erties in question; and, second, what types of attitudes comprise this construction
base. In §. I will argue that we can use Nietzsche’s perspectivism to address the
ĕrst question and capture the epistemic constraints on value creation discussed in
value. anks to John Richardson for helpful discussion.

§. In §. I will argue that we can use Nietzsche’s views on the will, aﬀects, and
valuing to yield a new way of addressing the second question. e primary aim in
this section is not to oﬀer a full philosophical defense of the resulting constructivist
view. It is rather, ĕrst, to delineate the central features, as well as the potential short-
comings, of Nietzschean constructivism; and, second, to elucidate a variety of ways
in which the view may be developed, depending on one’s views on certain further
philosophical and interpretive issues. Nietzschean constructivism represents a dis-
tinctive family of metaethical theories. I welcome the development of alternative
views and interpretations in this general family with which the present account may
be compared.
. Epistemic constraints on value creation
It is well known that Nietzsche took the possibility and measure of knowledge to be
crucially related to the essentially perspectival nature of experience: it is necessarily
from a particular aﬀective perspective, which directs our focus to certain features of
things and hides others, that we perceive, judge, value, and so on. As interpreters
have come to appreciate, at least in Nietzsche’s mature period this perspectival char-
acter of experience is seen not as hindering us from grasping truths about the world,
but rather as a condition for our doing so. is point is made forcefully in the fol-
lowing famous passage from the Genealogy:
“[O]bjectivity” [is to be] understood not as “contemplation without interest”
(which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and
Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of
perspectives and aﬀective interpretations in the service of knowledge…ere
is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing;” and themore aﬀects
we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, diﬀerent eyes, we can use
to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our
“objectivity,” be. (GM III:)
Knowledge is always interested and partial— there is no “view from nowhere.” Yet
we can increase our knowledge of the objective features of things by examining them
through a process of ruthless questioning and reversing of perspectives, aﬀects, and
interests. Nietzsche’s perspectivism is oen discussed concerning our knowledge of
See W , S , W , C , L , R
, P , J .
See also HH P:–, ; D ; GS ; Z III:.,; BGE P, , , ; GM I Note, III:;
EH I:, Z:; WP  [],  [–]; KSA .[] [].

the external world. I suggest that we can also appeal to Nietzsche’s perspectivism in
developing a distinctively Nietzschean normative epistemology and constructivist
metaethic. Values are properties of one’s own perspective, but not “merely” one’s
own perspective in any sense to be disparaged.
On one prominent way of developing constructivist theories inmetaethics, what
normative facts apply to an agent depends solely on facts about that agent’s evaluative
attitudes (e.g., S ). But Nietzsche appears to reject this, claiming that
it is speciĕcally the new philosophers, rather than human beings in general, that
can create genuine values. It is “[t]he ‘free’ man, the possessor of a protracted and
unbreakable will, [who] possesses his measure of value” (GM II:); it is “the poet”
who possesses “vis creativa, which the man of action lacks… It is we, the thinking-
sensing ones, who really and continuallymake” new values (GS ).
We can appeal to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the epistemic constraints dis-
cussed in § to explain why he treats the attitudes of the new philosophers as meta-
physically privileged in grounding evaluative properties. As we saw in §, value
judgments, for Nietzsche, can be judged based on the extent to which they are re-
sponsive to scientiĕc truths, especially those gleaned by genealogy; are comprehen-
sive, reĘecting a plurality of perspectives; are treated as revisable; are an outgrowth
of intellectual conscience and the discipline of the scientiĕc method; and so on.
ough we oen do treat as normative only those aﬀective attitudes that have these
features, Nietzsche oﬀers a story about why we should. Having an accurate view
of the world, for Nietzsche, is an expression of power over oneself and one’s envi-
ronment— e.g., power over one’s drives to simplify and to construct a worldview
that suits one’s immediate interests (cf. n. ). Satisfying Nietzsche’s epistemic con-
straints is an essential component of being a certain type of individual, one that
achieves Nietzsche’s broader ideal of freedom and, hence, power. e “precondi-
tion” (BGE ; cf. GS ) for creating new values that one satisfy these epistemic
constraints can then be understood metaphysically: It is the attitudes of the higher
types— speciĕcally, the newphilosopherswho achieve this ideal of freedom, with all
the psycho-physiological, historical, and epistemic demands that it implies— that
ground genuine values.
anks to an anonymous referee for encouragingme to get clearer on this issue. On the connec-
tion between freedom and power, see GS , ; GM II:,, III:; TI IX:; WP  [–].
“Freedom is strength or health of will… When the human drive synthesis is trained to discipline
its exceptional complexity of parts and to subordinate them to a long-term and unifying project, it
achieves a new kind of command… It’s the philosopher… who experiences this freedom and re-
sponsibility to the greatest degree, by virtue of commanding, and becoming responsible for, themost
such [drives and viewpoints]” (R : –). For further discussion of Nietzsche’s

Treating the attitudes of the higher types as comprising the construction base is
reinforced by Nietzsche’s suggestions that the legitimacy of a value depends on what
type of person it issues from, or on its etiology in the physiological and social history
of the individual—hence the importance of genealogy (cf. HH –; GM II:–).
For example, despite Nietzsche’s relentless condemnations of pity, he grants that
“when such a man [who is by nature a master] has pity, well, this pity has value”
(BGE ). Nietzsche endorses the possibility of reaccepting values, though from
diﬀerent motives, aer one’s genealogical critique (WS ; D ).
Importantly, the claim is not that the attitudes of the new philosophers are used
in the construction of new values because they have certain properties that are inde-
pendently valuable. Nietzsche denies that anything is valuable in itself. What is basic
in the metaethical account is the attitudes of a certain class of individuals— the new
philosophers. e normativity of power, intellectual conscience, etc. is grounded in
these more metaphysically fundamental evaluative attitudes. e fact, assuming it
is a fact, that we take the epistemic and practical constraints that guide and regulate
the attitudes of the new philosophers to be genuinely normative is good evidence
that we have found the correct construction base, the set of attitudes that ground
genuine values. But what is prior in the context of discovery (that such-and-such is
valuable) does not correspond to what is prior in the metaphysics (the attitudes of
such-and-such individuals). We must take care not to conĘate the claim that such-
and-such is good with the claim that such-and-such natural property grounds the
property of being good. e former is an axiological claim about what is valuable;
the latter is a metaphysical claim about the nature of value.
I have said that evaluative properties, for Nietzsche, are grounded in the eval-
uative attitudes of the new philosophers. is raises a number of questions, only
some of which I will even begin to address here. ere will be a number of choice
points. What is important for present purposes is less to decide among these alter-
natives than to observe that there are a plurality of ways of developing a Nietzschean
constructivism.
descriptions of the higher types, see, e.g., L ; : –; ; R :
–.
As has been emphasized forcefully in contemporary discussions, normative and metanorma-
tive questions about value and the nature of value are orthogonal to questions about how to deliberate
and what the explicit objects of deliberation ought to be. As applied to the present case, accepting
that evaluative properties are grounded in the evaluative attitudes of the new philosophers does not
commit one to thinking that engaging in evaluative discourse involves, or ought to involve, attempt-
ing to predict what the new philosophers will value. anks to an anonymous referee for raising this
objection.

ough what normative facts apply to an agent do not, in general, depend solely
on that agent’s evaluative attitudes, for the new philosophers we can say that what
is valuable for X is grounded in X’s evaluative attitudes. is captures Nietzsche’s
claims that the new philosopher “create[s] for [him]self an ideal of [his] very own”
(GS ) and “invent[s] his own virtue, his own categorical imperative” (A ). He
“gives style” to his life by setting his own ends, ends which make genuine claims on
him. What normative facts apply to a new philosopher depend solely on her own
attitudes and the laws she legislates for herself (GS ). But what should we say
about the values of the rest of us? How do the normative reasons of individuals of
the “herd” depend on the attitudes of the new philosophers?
One option is to say that a lower type’s values are grounded in what the new
philosophers value for her, and that the lower types are to promote the values of the
higher types (cf. H ). Alternatively, one might say that no normative facts
apply to individuals of the herd (cf. R ). But Nietzsche appears to re-
ject both of these options. “e ideas of the herd should rule in the herd,” even if they
should not “reach out beyond it” (WP  [–]). Under “industriousness,
rule, moderation, ĕrm ‘conviction’…— in short, the ‘herd virtues’,” the “interme-
diate type of man grows perfect” (WP  []; cf. BGE ). An individual of
the herd still has normative reasons, values, etc., which, even if they do not depend
directly on her attitudes, still seem to be importantly related to them.
One way of capturing this is as follows. It is well known that we can have eval-
uative preferences and judgments for hypothetical situations, even hypothetical sit-
uations of being in someone else’s shoes. Considering someone’s circumstances we
oen ask what we would do “if we were them.” I might have an actual evaluative
preference for the hypothetical case of being in Eve’s position at the Tree of Knowl-
edge, i.e., for the hypothetical case of self-ascribing the property of being Eve in
such-and-such internal and external circumstances.
is suggests the following revision to our constructivist theory: What is valu-
able for a lower type X is grounded in what the new philosophers value for the cir-
cumstance of being X. Since the new philosophers reject that the same things must
be valuable for diﬀerent types of people, they may regard diﬀerent things as good
conditional on being someone whose perspective is more limited. ey may have
diﬀerent valuations for the situation of being someone of a lower type. ough
for their actual situation they value “leisure, adventure, disbelief, even dissipation,”
Nietzschean constructivism may thus bear interesting aﬃnities to the contemporary naturalist
account in R , which treats an agent S’s non-moral good in terms of what S’s idealized self
S+— Swith full information and non-defective instrumental rationality—would want for Swere he
to ĕnd himself in S’s position.

they know that such things would “necessarily destroy” them were they a diﬀer-
ent type of person (WP  []). us, for the situation of being a “mediocre
type of man,” they may instead value the sorts of “herd virtues” mentioned above.
Given their genealogical insights, the new philosophers will have a superior under-
standing of herd psychology. ey will be better aware of how to integrate the lower
types’ drives and aﬀects in ways that promote health, learning from experience, and
responsiveness to the environment, and that avoid self-defeating patterns of reason-
ing, noxious feelings, and self-consciousness. e attitudes of the new philosophers
thus seem to be ĕt to ground normative facts that apply to the lower types.
is account has the additional advantage of capturing Nietzsche’s apparent de-
nials of the existence of universal normative facts— values that all agents are to
promote, ends that all agents have, reasons that all agents have to perform such-
and-such kind of action, and so on. (ough it is worth reiterating that construc-
tivism does not itself force us to deny that there are universal values (§.).) We
can continue to privilege the attitudes of the higher types in grounding evaluative
facts—namely, by limiting the construction base to the attitudes of the new philoso-
phers—while allowing that what is valuable can vary across individuals.
I have spoken of the attitudes of the new philosophers. But what if the attitudes
of the new philosophers conĘict? Should we assume that the new philosophers will
agree in attitude on most, or even any, evaluative questions? In response, one op-
tion is to take what is valuable for a lower type as being grounded in what all, or
alternatively some, of the new philosophers value for her. Depending on the extent
of their disagreement, this may leave us with fewer genuine values or reasons, or al-
ternatively with more normative conĘicts and dilemmas, than we ordinarily think.
Another option is to ground values in what the new philosophers would agree
to value as a group in the limit of some speciĕed sort of deliberative process. is
would yield a kind of contractualist account. ough grounding evaluative proper-
ties in counterfactual attitudes of the new philosophers would be a philosophically
respectable move, it may be problematic on interpretive grounds. It seems to ob-
scure Nietzsche’s claims that the new philosophers create values. Since facts about
what certain agents would value in such-and-such conditions can hold even if no
actual agent has those actual attitudes, coming to value new things need not bring
See also A ; Z II:, IV:; EH II:; WP  [–],  []. See also n. .
See esp. GS ; A ; cf. D , ; GS , , ; Z III:.; BGE , , , ,
, , , ; GM I:; TI V:; EH IV:; WP  []. See also n. . is leaves open
whether Nietzsche takes there to be a universal higher-order value or norm—e.g., will to power, self-
creation, freedom— that can be used to assess agents’ particular values or reasons (for discussion,
see R : –, : –; S : ; K ).

about the existence of new genuine values. For a similar reason we would no longer
be able to say that Nietzsche attempts to change what normative facts apply to cer-
tain of his hearers by virtue of changing their attitudes.
Treating evaluative properties as grounded in the actual attitudes of (some/most/
all of) the new philosophers may better capture the importance Nietzsche places
on the project of creating new values. Until individuals attain the freedom req-
uisite for genuine value creation—an end which is by no means guaranteed (BGE
)— there is a sense in which there are not any values. Despite—despite?— the
radical nature of this claim, Nietzsche seems to suggest precisely this: e new
philosophers “really and continuallymake something that is not yet there: the whole
perpetually growing world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, scales, aﬃr-
mations, and negations” (GS , emphasis mine).
Our emphasis on the epistemic constraints Nietzsche places on the creation of
new values naturally raises the question: What is the normative status of these epis-
temic constraints? As W (: –) observes, part of Nietzsche’s reval-
uation of values involves a revaluation of epistemic values. Nietzsche’s new “table
of values” must contain new epistemological, as well as practical, values—values
embracing perspectival judgment, empirical knowledge, and so on. Are Nietzsche’s
epistemic values attitude-dependent too? Are even our reasons to believe attitude-
dependence attitude-dependent?
It is important to distinguish two questions in the vicinity. One question con-
cerns why themetaphysical facts are as they are, or why it is speciĕcally the attitudes
of the new philosophers that ground normative facts. We should not expect Niet-
zsche to have an answer to this question since we do not typically demand expla-
nations for claims about metaphysical claims about what constitutes what or what
grounds what.
A secondway of understanding the question concerns whatmakes putative epis-
temic values genuinely valuable, or what makes some proposition a genuine epis-
temic reason for so-and-so to believe something. is question ismore legitimate—
and extremely diﬃcult. Although I doubt that Nietzsche had any established views
on this issue, one option is to say, for the sake of consistency, that epistemic val-
ues are also attitude-dependent. What would make, e.g., examining issues from a
multiplicity of perspectives epistemically valuable is that doing so is endorsed by the
new philosophers. Admittedly, it is contentious how metaethical accounts like this
Nietzsche seems to waver onwhether there have already been such individuals; but if there have
been, he thinks they are very rare (see, e.g., GM II:, ; Z P:; A P; EH IV:; WP  []).
See also GS ; Z III:.; EH IV:.

ought to be ĕlled in and whether they can be made to work (S ).
Even if we do not interpret Nietzsche as a constructivist about epistemic val-
ues, our reasons to accept attitude-dependence might still be understood as be-
ing attitude-dependent. e claim of attitude-dependence might itself be treated
as an evaluative claim. On this line, the nascent higher types will come through
their genealogical inquiries to regard accepting attitude-independence as a symp-
tom of weakness. Since this is a weakness they despise, they may spurn a posi-
tive attitude toward attitude-independence and, avoiding despair, endorse attitude-
dependence.
In these ways we can use Nietzsche’s perspectivism and conception of epistemic
values to help answer the question of what/whose attitudes ground normative facts.
Nietzschean constructivism is not a kind of “voluntarism” which treats genuine val-
ues as the product of a brute act of will or “radical choice… which is not grounded
in any reasons” (T : ). Genuine values, for Nietzsche, are not “arbi-
trary” in the sense of being arational. ey are subject to various intuitively rational
constraints: they are assessable in light of facts about the world, responsive to ev-
idence, capable of and requiring justiĕcation, and so on. Of course these values
might be “arbitrary” in the sense of being attitude-dependent. But this, again, is
itself no obstacle to their making genuine claims on us.
. Aﬀects and evaluative attitudes
In the last sectionwe saw that part ofwhat privileges the attitudes of the newphiloso-
phers in the construction of normative properties is that the new philosophers have
occupied a multiplicity of diﬀerent perspectives. For Nietzsche, these perspectives
are fundamentally aﬀective. A perspective on theworld involves experiencing it with
certain interests and aﬀects, attending to certain features over others; and changing
one’s perspective on something involves changing one’s feelings toward it. In this
section I will argue that we can use Nietzsche’s views on the aﬀects to yield a dis-
tinctive and improved answer to the question of what types of attitudes comprise
the construction base for normative properties.
Valuing, on Nietzsche’s view, is not a distinctively cognitive attitude speciĕc to
human beings. It is not an essentially structured attitude consisting of a basic “tak-
ing” attitude borne toward some content that is then ascribed the property of “being
Cf. L : –. For related discussion in contemporary metaethics, see B-
 : –; G : –, : –; S , a.
For voluntarist interpretations, see N ; L : –; L ; cf.
L : .

valuable.” It needn’t even be conscious. Rather, valuing in its most basic form is to
be identiĕed with the aﬀective coding of things and stimuli that we share with other
creatures. Valuational attitudes are essentially aﬀective, where an aﬀect [Aﬀekt] is a
certain kind of pro- or con-attitude, a “For [or] Against” (WP  [– ]).
As R (: ) puts it, “Value lies in the way the world is ‘polarized’ for
each will and not in any theories or beliefs about value. It lies in how things ‘mat-
ter’ to the will,” in aﬀects. is way of understanding valuation bears an obvious
resemblance to contemporary dual-process models of the mind. On these models,
perceptual signals interact with the areas of the brain responsible for learning, en-
coding, and experiencing reward and aﬀect before being accessible for higher-order
self-conscious thought (e.g., H , E ; see n. ). is prior aﬀec-
tive system is indeed ancient and one we have inherited from non-human animals.
Aﬀective systems ĕrst code incoming information as having positive, negative, or
neutral valence; this then shapes the content and character of the perception, and,
in more intelligent animals, the associations, thoughts, and memories that are cued.
We diﬀerentially attend to diﬀerent features of our environment and assign signif-
icance relative to our ends. We represent a given situation as dangerous. It is on
the basis of such evaluative representations that we are then readied for action. (It
is important to emphasize that an “evaluative representation” in this psychological
sense needn’t be understood as a representation of some fundamentally normative
proposition or state of aﬀairs.)
On Nietzsche’s view, not only isn’t it necessary for valuing to be conscious. An-
ticipating developments in contemporary empirical psychology, Nietzsche holds
that valuing is oen best when it isn’t conscious:
Onnon-human valuings, the non-consciousness of certain drives, and the connections between
willing, valuing, aﬀects, and drives, see also HH ; GS ; BGE , ; WP  [–], 
[–],  [–],  [],  [],  [–]; KSA .[] [],
.[] []. us I disagree with Hussain’s (: n.) objection to interpreting Nietzsche
as accepting attitude-dependence (to use my terminology) on the ground that Nietzsche treats “pro-
attitudes themselves [as] constituted by evaluative judgments” and “bemoans” this fact (HH ).
e assumption of attitude-independence that renders these judgments “unjust” is not essential to
the more basic pro- and con-attitudes from which values are constructed. It is with these points in
mind that we can also understandNietzsche’s attacks on “teleology”: valuation, though end-directed,
needn’t involve conscious or deliberative aiming. For other interpretations of Nietzsche that have
emphasized this point, see, e.g., N , R b. For contemporary discussion, see,
e.g., R , a; T . anks to Peter Railton for discussion.
See also GS ; WP  [–],  []. On the liability of conscious reĘection on
one’s valuations, see esp. B & C , D  . . On the infor-
mativeness of the aﬀects, discussed below, see, e.g., S & C , , O  .
, S  . , S , as well as references therein. See R a,c,d for

If one considers that one is dealing with a sovereignly developed type that
has ‘acted’ for countless millennia, and in which everything has become in-
stinct, expediency, automatism, fatality, then the urgency of this moral ques-
tion [‘How should one act?’] must actually seem ridiculous…[T]he becoming-
conscious of the values by which one acts—betrays a certain sickliness; strong
ages and peoples do not reĘect… on their instincts and reasons. Becoming-
conscious is a sign that real morality, i.e., instinctive certainty in actions, is
going to the devil. (WP  [])
Our aﬀects are the products of millennia of selection for eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness.
Consequently, they are paradigmatically informative (GM III:; n. ) and reg-
ulative (GS ; WP , , ). By reĘecting on our values and what to do, we
oen rob our aﬀects of their force and momentum. We undermine their character-
istic attunement to the diverse dimensions of our situation and environment, and
the consequent capacity to translate this attunement directly into attention, moti-
vation, and action. (Consider: the skilled free-throw shooter who suddenly starts
thinking about how to shoot.)
In addition, it is our active aﬀects— those that directly will power (WP 
[–])— that Nietzsche prizes most. Roughly, the will to power is the aim to
overcome resistance and extend one’s inĘuence and abilities, especially over oneself,
but also over others and other things. Unlike their “passive” or “reactive” counter-
parts, which may include reĘection, our active attitudes express health, strength,
mastery, truth, and honesty, and are synthesized in a “master of a free will” (GM
II:; see also I:–, II:–).
is brief sketch of Nietzsche’s views on evaluative attitudes suggests a way of
ĕlling in our constructivist account. We can say that the construction base con-
sists of these sorts of aﬀective valuations. Since it is the new philosophers whose
attitudes form the construction base, values will be grounded in speciĕcally active
attitudes that directly express a will to power and are integrated in a complex hier-
archy toward a unifying project. (To reiterate, the claim is not that activity has some
attitude-independent value which explains why it is active attitudes that comprise
the construction base; what is metaphysically basic is a certain class of individuals,
the attitudes of which ground the normativity of values (§.).)
discussion of the philosophical importance of the informative and regulative nature of the aﬀects.
ough, of course, not in all cases: consider “the venomous eye of ressentiment,” which sees the
noble “dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion” (GM I:) and disposes the slavish to
seek revenge with “the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred” (GM I:). See J  for
emphasis on the crucial role of the aﬀects in Nietzsche’s genealogical method.

is philosophical account of the construction base is all well and good, one
might grant, but there is something about it thatmight seemdistinctly un-Nietzschean.
I have treated the evaluative attitudes that comprise the construction base as aﬀects.
Aﬀects are multi-channel representational attitudes. ey prime attention, mem-
ory, thought, inference, feelings, learning, and reward in a directed appraisal of a
situation. In certain circumstances this appraisal may then ready us for action in a
plastic pursuit of some goal. ough it would be anachronistic to attribute to Niet-
zsche a view on the aﬀects that is comparable to that of contemporary psychology,
is it even accurate to treat Nietzsche as wielding the same concept? Didn’t he think
of the aﬀects as drives? And aren’t drives fundamentally non-teleological brute im-
pulses? If so, why think such attitudes are ĕt to ground genuine values?
ere is a potential limitation in Nietzsche’s psychological view, but it should
not be overstated. It is true that Nietzsche understands people in terms of soci-
eties of “drives” [Trieb], “forces” [Kra], even “power quanta” [Machtquanta]. is
might seem to suggest an antiquated non-teleological, hydraulic psychodynamics
characteristic of th-century psychology or th-century behaviorism. Given the
historical context, it would not be surprising if Nietzsche understood drives simply
as directed releases of motivational energy. ough this is certainly not the place to
oﬀer a thorough investigation of Nietzsche’s psychology and biology of drives and
aﬀects, I think there is good evidence that Nietzsche understood drives in a way
that more closely resembles aﬀects in the contemporary psychologist’s sense.
It is clear even from the stock phrase “will to power” that wills and drives, for Ni-
etzsche, are directed attitudes toward some end. AsNietzsche’s perspectivismmakes
vivid, these directed attitudes are crucially intentional. (Nietzsche sometimes speaks
of this intentionality as characteristic of the drives of all living things, but we can
bracket this excrescence here.) Drives are perspectives on some intentional object:
“every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own
particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance” (WP  []).
ese perspectives are fundamentally evaluative. ey inĘuence the content and
character of our experience (D ), and aﬀord for the prospecting organism an
evaluative representation of possible acts and outcomes. is representation, as
we have seen, can be genuinely informative and regulative. Unlike brute instincts,
which are, in a sense, merely passive— they happen to us—Nietzschean drives are,
at their best, fundamentally active attitudes.
See, e.g., P ; P ; R , ; L ; J ,
, ; K , ; C & D ; A .
See alsoGMII:, III:;WP [–],  [–],  [],  [–].
See also GS , , , ; BGE , . Cf. n. .
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Take creativity, Nietzsche’s paradigm activity. Creativity lies not in narrow mo-
tivations, but in complex, multi-channel attitudes. Listening to a riveting perfor-
mance of the fourth movement of Dvorák’s Ninth Symphony, or to John Coltrane
tearing up a solo in Mr. P.C. does not just lead you to tap your foot. It elicits a
range of emotions, imaginings, memories, ideas, expectations. You are sensitive to
features of the phrasing, dynamics, and tempo and how they diﬀer from those in
other performances. You hear with expectation how the lines are to be shaped. You
notice nascent feelings and the images they conjure. You attend to certain features
of your body, the sensory character of the hall, and the audience’s response, while
completely ignoring others. Similarly, though the musician’s creative act may not
be governed by deliberation or intent, it is not merely “driven” or “on instinct.” She
is highly focused and sensitive to a wide array of subtle changes in circumstance
and mood; she knows precisely what she is doing. is non-deliberative, non-self-
conscious character is not only not a defect; it is a paradigm of skillful expression.
is should all sound familiar. Nietzschean drives are beginning to look less like
brute impulses, instincts, or behavioral tendencies, or even drives in the Freudian
sense, and more like aﬀects as described above. Indeed—and unabashedly beg-
ging the question— from the man himself: “will to power is the primitive form of
aﬀect” (WP  []; cf. BGE ). is is not to say that Nietzsche’s focus on
“drives” was without detriment. An emphasis on Aﬀekt over Trieb would have been
more accurate, or at least less misleading. In any case, what is important for present
purposes is that we can extract from Nietzsche an attractive picture of the aﬀects,
one that is continuous with contemporary psychological research, in developing a
distinctively Nietzschean version of constructivism.
Treating the construction base as constituted by the aﬀective valuations of the
new philosophers has a number of interpretive and philosophical features. First, it
directly captures a very real sense in which “goodness” “resides in instinct” (WP 
[]): value “resides in” instincts—understood in the directed, intentional way
as qualiĕed above—by being grounded in them.
Second, we can capture a sense in which normativity is grounded in states of
agential activity. e values of the new philosophers are not grounded in attitudes
that they simply ĕnd themselves with, or in other facts independent of their own cre-
ative will. For the new philosophers, responding to reasons and values is essentially
Pace S ; C ; R ; J ; L .
Pace certain suggestions in K .
An advantage of this account of drives and aﬀects as aﬀording evaluative representations is that
it can capture the intentionality of these attitudes without having to attribute to them an implausible
kind of agency, as in the interpretations in P  and C & D .
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an active, creative process.
Relatedly, third, it is a commonplace that Nietzsche values power. By restricting
the construction base to the attitudes of the new philosophers, and hence to active
drives, we can capture Nietzsche’s presentations of the will to power as a princi-
ple guiding his revaluation of values. As exemplars of the will to power, the new
philosophers will express this will in their genealogical critiques of their past and
prospective values, and in which values they create.
Fourth, it is a general constraint on constructivist accounts that the attitudes
comprising the construction base be characterizable in non-normative terms (S
: –). For example, as noted above, the attitude of treating as valuable
mustn’t need to be understood in terms of being valuable. is is to avoid a charge of
circularity, i.e., that the account builds the properties it is trying to explain into the
explanans. Nietzschean constructivism straightforwardly satisĕes this constraint.
Aﬀective drives— the attitudes treated as comprising the construction base— are
examined extensively in Nietzsche’s psychological investigations as well as in con-
temporary empirical psychology.
Finally, this account improves on certain contemporary constructivist accounts.
On one prominent such account, that of Sharon Street, the construction base is
treated as consisting of our unreĘective, spontaneous normative judgments, or our
attitudes of “taking to be a reason.” For Street, our understanding of the attitude
of taking something to be a reason “is given by our knowledge of what it is like to
have a certain [conscious] unreĘective experience… I believe it is impossible ade-
quately to characterize this experience except in… primitive evaluative terms, yet I
think we all know exactly the type of experience I am pointing to” (: ). No
doubt Street is right about the familiarity of this type of experience and the existence
of the attitude of taking-to-be-a-reason. But characterizing this allegedly basic atti-
tudemerely phenomenologically is insuﬃcient. Onemust say more about its nature
and function in creatures’ psychic economy and behavior so as to illuminate why we
should think that genuine reasons, values, etc. are constituted in terms it. By con-
trast, we can integrate our account of the construction base with Nietzsche’s, and
contemporary psychology’s, more comprehensive views on aﬀects and valuations.
We typically understand value as essentially playing a certain causal and regulatory
role, along with belief, in relating agents to the world and guiding action. Building
For contemporary discussion of grounding reasons in passive vs. active attitudes, see, e.g., K-
 , W , C .
See, e.g., BGE , ; GM P:, P:, I:; A , , ; WP  [–],  [–],
 [–].
See esp. S : –; see also her : –, n.; b: –.
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on our discussion in §., given Nietzsche’s account of the role of valuational atti-
tudes in the higher types’ overall health and mastery over self and environment, it
is evident how these attitudes are ĕt to ground genuine value.
Let’s recap. In § we saw that by interpreting Nietzsche as a metaethical con-
structivist we could resolve the tension observed in § between Nietzsche’s claims
that nothing is valuable in itself, on the one hand, and his engagements in norma-
tive discourse and injunctions to create values, on the other. In this section we have
developed amore precise, though by nomeans complete, version of constructivism.
According to Nietzschean constructivism, as developed here, normative properties
are grounded in properties of the aﬀective valuations of the new philosophers. is
account captures various further features of Nietzsche’s ethics, metaethics, episte-
mology, and philosophical psychology, and is continuous with contemporary em-
pirical research. It also provides further reasons for thinking that genuine values,
values that make legitimate claims on us, are grounded in the proposed way.
 Value creation and evaluative attitudes
It will be instructive to examine certain other interpretations that emphasize the
importance of evaluative attitudes in accounting for the nature of value. is dis-
cussion, though necessarily brief for reasons of space, will help situate the proposed
constructivist interpretation in the literature and clarify the relation between values
and evaluative attitudes.
First, interpreters are sometimes unclear about what is required for a metaethi-
cal account of the dependence of values on evaluative attitudes. For example, Paul
Katsafanas’s “constitutivist” interpretation attempts to capture how power, though
“not an objective value,” has a “privileged normative status,” namely, by its being “the
constitutive aim of action” (: –). On this view, even though power is not
independently valuable, we, as actors, are committed to its being valuable insofar as
it is the constitutive aim of willing. However, this view does not itself constitute a
metaethical position on the nature of value. e claim that we are committed to the
value of power, or even that power is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable,
does not itself imply an answer to the question of what makes it the case that power
is valuable (§.). I do not deny that the step from the claim that we are com-
Similar remarks hold for interpretations that appear to incorporateNietzsche’s valuing of power
into a naturalist realist metaethical account that reduces value to power (see, e.g., S ,
, K , W , H , R , , L , R-
 ). It is not always clear whether these interpretations ascribe to Nietzsche a genuinely
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mitted to the value of power to the claim that this very commitment grounds the
value of power is a natural one. But it is important to see that it is not forced upon
us. Katsafanas’s claim is consistent with the claim that power is valuable because it
instantiates some other irreducible, non-natural property. us Katsafanas is too
quick when he says that his account captures how “the value of power is created by
us” (: ). By contrast, our constructivist interpretation explicitly connects
Nietzsche’s denials of objectivity and his positive claims concerning value creation.
Second, constructivism is an instance of a more general type of metaethical po-
sition, sometimes called “subjectivist realism,” which attempts to ground normative
properties in psychological properties of agents. e kinds of subjectivist realism at-
tributed to Nietzsche in the literature have been crude. On grounds of interpretive
charity, this has led interpretations of this type to be summarily dismissed. For ex-
ample, the signiĕcance of the distinction between values in the descriptive sense and
values in the normative sense (§.) is oen underappreciated, even among theorists
who treat the latter as grounded in the former. For instance, on the interpretation
in R —arguably the best developed subjectivist realist interpreta-
tion in the literature—Nietzsche refuses “to allow any values or goods that are not
the intentional objects of some valuing; there’s only a value if there’s a valuing of
it” (; cf. , , ). e values one takes to be normative—one’s “values to
value”—are simply those goals that happen to be the objects of one’s own valuing.
Such a strong version of attitude-dependence is oen thought to be implausible (cf.
C & D : ). Among other things, it makes it hard to see how
one could be mistaken or ignorant about what is genuinely valuable, or at least hard
to see how easy it is to be mistaken or ignorant in this way. If I recognize that I have
some value that I do not reĘectively endorse, I may accept that it is an object of my
own valuing— I may accept that I am “explained by [it] as an end” ()—while
denying that it is worth pursuing or has genuine normative force. By contrast, ac-
cording to constructivism, values are constructed out of agents’ evaluative attitudes
without necessarily being identiĕed with them. What an agent values and what is
valuable for her can come apart.
Similarly, many interpreters seem to assume that denying the independence of
values commits one to thinking that one’s “own evaluative position… is no more
than the expression of [one’s] particular evaluative taste or sensibility” (R
: ), and that all evaluative judgments are “on the same epistemological plain”
metaethical claim about what grounds the property of being valuable, as opposed merely to an ax-
iological claim about what is valuable. R  is perhaps clearest on this, referring to
Nietzsche’s “external-realist intent.”
See K : – and L :  for similar attributions.
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(L : ; cf. , ). As we saw in §§. and ., this inference is too
quick. ere aremore sophisticated ways of capturing themetaphysical dependence
of values on evaluative attitudes that avoids these counterintuitive consequences.
On the constructivist view developed here, evaluative judgments can be correct or
incorrect and more or less supported by rational argument.
ird, diﬀerent metaethical positions that connect motivational attitudes, val-
ues, and evaluative judgments are sometimes not adequately delineated in the litera-
ture. For example, C & D  defends an interpretation of Nietzsche
as a non-cognitivist. Very roughly, non-cognitivists about normative language
claim that normative sentences do not, as a matter of their conventional meaning,
represent how the world is. Non-cognitivism is thus, in part, a semantic view—a
view about the conventional contents of normative sentences, and, similarly, the
nature of normative beliefs. As contemporary developments of non-cognitivism
have underscored, this semantic thesis is neutral on questions concerning the na-
ture of normative properties, e.g., on whether normative properties are attitude-
independent. e problem is that it is these latter questions, not the former seman-
tic questions, that are of principal interest to Nietzsche—not to mention that it is
highly implausible that Nietzsche even had worked out semantic view on the con-
ventional meanings of normative terms. e non-cognitivist needn’t say that we
make “things beautiful, attractive, and desirable when they are not”; or that “the pas-
sions constitute ‘all that has given color to existence’ ”; or that the new philosophers
“create values… in part by inducing in people new aﬀective responses to things”
(C & D : , ). Evidence that Nietzsche took there to be
some connection between motivational attitudes and evaluative judgments is not
suﬃcient for treating him as a non-cognitivist. Indeed, the texts in question, and
even some of Clark and Dudrick’s own remarks about them, better support a con-
structivist interpretation.
Finally, perhaps the strongest challenge to the constructivist interpretation of-
fered in this paper comes fromNadeemHussain’s () interpretation of Nietzsche
as a revolutionary ĕctionalist. Hussain’s interpretation is rich. ough a thorough
See N  and L  for similar claims.
See H , b for further discussion.
E.g., B , , ; G , . See also S b for discussion.
Cf. L : –, : n., , ; S : n.; H :
, b: .
Similar remarks hold for Leiter’s (: ) suggestion thatNietzsche’s talk of creating new values
by a legislative act of will could be treated as evidence for non-cognitivism.
See also H , b; cf. R .
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response must be reserved for elsewhere (S a), I would like to make a pre-
liminary case that a constructivist interpretation fares better.
Revolutionary ĕctionalism starts with an error theory about our current evalu-
ative thought and talk. e error theory consists of a semantic claim and a meta-
physical claim. e semantic claim is that normative predicates, as a matter of their
conventional meaning, purport to refer to attitude-independent normative proper-
ties. emetaphysical claim is that there are no such properties. us, according to
the error theorist, all sentences ascribing a normative predicate to some object are
systematically false. e revolutionary ĕctionalist proposes that we replace this
problematic evaluative practice with one that no longer involves a commitment to
attitude-independent normative properties. On the speciĕc form of revolutionary
ĕctionalism Hussain ascribes to Nietzsche, the free spirits are to engage in “a sim-
ulacrum of valuing”: “Nietzsche’s recommended practice is a form of make-believe
or pretence. Nietzsche’s free spirits pretend to value something by regarding it as
valuable in itself while knowing that in fact it is not valuable in itself ” (: ). It
is in terms of such attitudes of “regarding as valuable” that Hussain proposes to un-
derstand Nietzsche’s injunctions for the free spirits to create values: e free spirits
are to create values in the sense that they are to replace their previous practice of be-
lieving that things are valuable in themselves with a practice of regarding new things
as valuable in themselves, while lacking the concomitant belief that they are.
Start with the ĕctionalist’s proposed replacement linguistic practice. First, it is
puzzling why Hussain should think that a ĕctionalist interpretation is well placed to
capture Nietzsche’s talk of value creation (§). Nietzsche claims that wemake things
valuable even though they are not valuable in themselves. e problem for Hussain
is that pretending to value does not create values anymore than riding around cack-
ling on a broom creates a witch. A ĕctionalist interpretation thus fails to capture
Nietzsche’s claims that there are values and that the new philosophers transform re-
ality by creating new values. Indeed, because of ĕctionalism’s commitment to error
theory, a ĕctionalist interpretation is inconsistent with these claims. A construc-
tivist interpretation, by contrast, can take Nietzsche’s claims about value creation at
face value (§.). e new philosophers confer genuine value on the world.
Second, even if Hussain is right that having honest ĕctions is compatible with
striving for truth, it is hard to see how a ĕctionalist interpretation can capture Ni-
etzsche’s epistemic constraints on value creation (§§, .). Consider the force of
Or systematically suﬀer from presupposition failure, as on presuppositional versions of error
theory, according to which normative predicates conventionally carry a false presupposition.
H : –, responding to the objection in C & D : n..
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Nietzsche’s praises of epistemic honesty and courage and corresponding denunci-
ations of self-deception. And consider the lengths to which Nietzsche goes to dis-
abuse us of our belief in attitude-independence, a belief that Nietzsche takes to be as
dangerous as it is deeply engrained. It would be surprising at best if Nietzsche’s ul-
timate positive injunction for the free spirits was then for them to act as if they were
too weak to “assume the right to new values…, the most terrifying assumption for a
reverent spirit” (Z I:), and had “rid [themselves] of the responsibility… of positing
a goal for [themselves]” (WP  []). A constructivist interpretation avoids
this worry. e new philosophers are to engage in genuine valuing, but a kind that
does not assume a false metaphysics. ey are not paralyzed by the contingency,
risk, and provisionality in creating values: “no longer the humble expressions, ‘ev-
erything ismerely subjective,’ but ‘it is also our work!—Let us be proud of it!’ ” (WP
 []). In a paradigm expression of life-aﬃrmation, the new philosophers
embrace their values in full view of their metaphysical dependence on human eval-
uative attitudes. Nietzsche’s theoretical inquiry into the nature of value motivates a
practical reformation in how to live.
Hussain claims that interpretingNietzsche as accepting the attitude-dependence
of value cannot do justice to the apparent systematicity of Nietzsche’s rejection of
evaluative claims (: –; : –; a). is motivates Hussain
to interpret Nietzsche as accepting an error theory. It would be easy to decry the
fetishization and reiĕcation of value in the manner characteristic of error theo-
rists, as Nietzsche in fact does, without having a sophisticated semantic view about
whether evaluative terms conventionally purport to refer to attitude-independent
normative properties. But it is crucial for the motivation of a ĕctionalist replace-
ment of our ordinary evaluative practice that one does have such a view. It is only if
a term could not be an evaluative term unless it referred to an attitude-independent
property that any linguistic practice in which speakers used evaluative terms—or
at least terms that are homophonous with our evaluative terms—without assuming
attitude-independence would be incompatible with our current linguistic practice.
e problem is that it is likely anachronistic to interpret Nietzsche as having this
sort of sophisticated semantic view (n. ). e constructivist can avoid this worry.
Constructivism, as understood here, is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of
Engrained, that is, by thousands of years of selection pressures favoring the herd instinct. See
esp. D , ; GS ; WP  []. On the resulting quasi-perceptual character of evaluative ex-
perience, see HH , ; GS , , ; CW E;WP  [–],  [–]; for discussion
see P , , A , and K .
See also D , GS ; BGE , –; GM II:; A ; WP  [–].
See also GS , , ; Z I:; BGE ; WP  [].

normativity. Strictly speaking, it is neutral on the semantics of normative terms.
e Nietzschean constructivist can simply say that in light of the ubiquity of the ac-
ceptance of attitude-independence, many evaluative claims have assumed a false and
psychologically deĕcient view of the world. Nietzsche’s apparently error-theoretic
claims are consistent with the denial of error theory.
 Conclusion
us concludes our whirlwind tour of Nietzsche’s normative and metanormative
theory, touching on such themes as the revaluation of values, the will to power, per-
spectivism, drives and aﬀects, Nietzsche’s style, and practical nihilism. We began
with a puzzle concerning an apparent tension among Nietzsche’s claims that noth-
ing is valuable in itself, his wholehearted endorsements of various values, and his
injunctions for the free spirits to create new values. By interpreting Nietzsche as
a metaethical constructivist we can resolve this puzzle: Some things are genuinely
valuable, but their value is grounded in facts about creatures’ evaluative attitudes;
thus by coming to value new things, the new philosophers can create new genuine
values. Drawing on Nietzsche’s broader epistemological and psychological views, I
developed a distinctive, and genuinely Nietzschean, version of constructivism. On
this account, evaluative properties are grounded in the aﬀective valuations of the
new philosophers. Of course much more work is required, and many interpretive
and philosophical questions remain. But I hope to have shown that the resulting
version of constructivism is not only plausibly attributable to Nietzsche—all the
usual caveats and hedges notwithstanding—but also worthy of attention in con-
temporary theorizing.
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